Cognitive Flexibility – How it Works

The Nature of Cognitive Flexibility

” In some instances cognitive flexibility is discussed in the context of processes requiring shifts in attention (e.g., attentional flexibility [7], attention switch- ing [8], attentional set shifting [9]). In others, it is oper- ationalized by the tasks that are used to measure it (e.g., set shifting [10], task switching “^​1​

However, using associative learning methods, which are “trigger-specific in nature” and in which “learned associations are known to bind to the context in which they occur,” it was “recently demonstrated that the act of task switching can be conditioned by reward,” and that “the choice to be cognitively flexible is very susceptible to its recent reinforcement-learning history,” at least in neurotypicals.^​2​

A traditional assumption of cognitive flexibility (and 
cognitive control [executive functions] more broadly) is that it is generalizable. Thus, the processes responsible for task switching are not thought to be specific to particular tasks but to be shared among all possible task-switching conditions. Consequently, many scholars have hypothesized that the effects of training people on being more cognitively flexible in one task context should transfer to other tasks measuring cognitive flexibility. However, recent meta-analyses have demonstrated that cognitive training studies rarely find transfer. ^​2​

” This finding emphasizes a key distinction in the effects of learned stimulus–control versus stimulus–response associations: Whereas the latter are specific (e.g., promoting a particular motor response), the former are generalizable (here, aiding the switch to any other task; Egner, 2014). The extent of this generalizability (e.g., to other measures of cognitive flexibility), however, remains an interesting avenue for future research “^​2​ ” hrough learning, stimuli in our environment can be bound to the processes underlying cognitive flexibility (e.g., to an “updating threshold”; cf. Goschke, 2003) and eventually help trigger cognitive flexibility from the bottom up, even subliminally. By relying on these fast associative-learning processes, the contextual triggering of cognitive flexibility may allow for a more efficient and less effortful allocation of control strategies. “^​2​

For example, in one computer-based study, items for cognitively difficult tasks would show up in the same region of the screen. “Over time this high-demand context comes to implicitly cue the retrieval of the appropriate attentional set, thus making participants better at meeting high task demands in that spatial context.” “Subliminally presented (i.e., not consciously perceived) cues signaling a higher likelihood of task switches were followed by smaller task-switch costs” as well.^​2​

Research on CF & associative-learning processes is relatively new, but have great promise for the development of effective CF training programs.^​2​

” Cognitive-control mechanisms allow us to use internal goals and current context to guide information process- ing from the top down (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001). For example, we can combine the contextual information of seeing a traffic officer with our goal of personal safety to impose a new set of rules on how we link stimuli to actions (i.e., focus on the officer’s hands rather than the malfunctioning traffic lights). Imposing control in this manner involves overriding well-learned, habitual actions (e.g., braking when the traffic light turns red), and, accordingly, cognitive control has traditionally been seen as diametrically opposed to basic associative-learning mechanisms that mediate the bind- ing of stimuli to responses in routine behavior “^​2​ ” Whereas associative learning is generally thought to produce fast, automatized stimulus– response links that can run unsupervised (and possibly unconsciously), cognitive control is thought to require volition and attention to produce slow but strategic action “^​2​

” In contrast, associative-learning processes are thought to be trigger-specific in nature, as learned associations are known to bind to the context in which they occur (Pearce & Bouton, 2001). In behavioral psychology, this is often referred to as stimulus control, but we will speak of the context specificity of learned behavior. For exam- ple, the habit of smoking can be very context-specific: Environments that have been more frequently associated with smoking in the past will induce a higher urge to smoke, independently of the availability of cigarettes (Dols, van den Hout, Kindt, & Willems, 2002). Intrigu- ingly, recent studies have documented that the same class of phenomena can be observed in relation to cognitive-control settings. For instance, if a spatial con- text (such as screen location) is predictive of more chal- lenging task demands, over time this high-demand context comes to implicitly cue the retrieval of the appropriate attentional set, thus making participants bet- ter at meeting high task demands in that spatial context “^​2​

” Cognitive flexibility is the capacity to inhibit a dominant response when it represents a non- optimal or inappropriate solution to a problem, and to enable access to more remote alternatives. For our purposes, cognitive flexibility will refer to flexibility of access to the lexical–semantic and associative network in a verbal problem-solving task in contrast to other forms of cognitive flexibility such as set-shifting. “^​3​

With other EFs

” Several subdomains of EF act coherently to successfully implement cognitive flexibility”^​1​ “

• In constantly changing environments, individuals must first identify how their surroundings have changed by directing attention to those elements that are in flux.
• After ascertaining that a previous strategy is not appropriate in the new environment, individuals must inhibit previous responses and reconfigure a new strategy.
• Individuals take in infor- mation and manipulate it in real time to flexibly switch responses from one scenario to another.
• Cognitive flexibility is not merely the sum of implementing various EFs but also requires shifting, or the reconfiguration of one’s response set to the new goal.

Inhibition. ” When actions and goals need to be updated to adapt to a new environment, previously engaged responses must be inhibited. Inhibitory control is thus a crucial aspect of cognitive flexibility “^​1​

Working Memory ” There is also conceptual overlap between task-switching research and the study of working memory updating, although the latter tends to focus primarily on changing “items” in (declarative) working memory rather than (procedural) task rules “^​2​ ” Cognitive flexibility tasks require the maintenance of two or more rule representations for successful completion. “^​1​

Attention. “The relative salience of a stimulus determines whether it will capture attention and be processed further. …The process of salience detection is the first step toward attention allocation and subsequent implementation of flexible responses “^​1​ ” or example, unexpected stimuli that cue a switch phase direct attention via the VAN. In other tasks, experimenters may provide cues that indicate what rule should be implemented and thus the participant exerts top-down control to orient to the relevant features of the stimulus. These attentional sys- tems may also work synergistically to filter incoming sensory information that is relevant to the goal. Regard- less of the extent to which these attentional systems are recruited, the DAN and VAN are critically involved in successful cognitive flexibility “^​1​

Shifting

” Cognitive flexibility is commonly measured using a task-switching paradigm (…), which produces 2 indexes: switch cost and set inhibition. “^​4​

Set Shifting

“Set shifting: a type of lower-level cognitive flexibility task that requires individuals to follow one set of rules to complete a task then shift to using a different set of rules to complete the task”^​1​ “Stimulus–response mapping reversal can also be catego- rized as a form of set shifting where the goal remains the same (press button x for stimulus y) but simply changing the hand press determines the switch in set.. Thus, set shifting entails using a new set of rules to complete the same task.”^​1​ ” Instead of switching between two types of instruction like in task switching, switching between sets may com- prise shifting attention between different features of the stimulus to complete the same instruction. For example, in the Casey et al. (2004) task, shapes were consistently presented throughout the task and children were instructed to ‘pick the unique object’ from three stimuli. The children must implicitly determine whether to pick the object based on two perceptual features: shape or color. The instruction (and therefore, the task) is always the same no matter how individuals choose the object. “^​1​

Task Shifting

“Task switching: a type of higher-level cognitive flexibility task that involves shifting between two types of trial where participants: (i) switch between two simple tasks; and (ii) repeat the same task [12].”^​1​ “In general, task switch- ing paradigms, which are inherently more complex than set shifting tasks, tend to impose greater working memory demands.”^​1​ “In task switching, participants must switch between tasks with different instructions given some stimulus”^​1​

“The task-switching literature investigates switching between task sets. Task sets can be considered a configuration of context-dependent production (if–then) rules that are actively maintained to guide our current behavior. For example, when we want to call a friend, we use a given set of rules to navigate through our phone, which define our task set. While certain com- ponents are often shared across task sets, it is their associations with the different rules and goals that make task sets unique (e.g., pushing a number to dial a phone number vs. pushing a number to change floors in an elevator).”^​2​

” A possible role for associative learning in task switch-ing was initially investigated only at the level of task sets. Studies showed that task sets can be bound to, and primed by, task-relevant (…) and task-irrelevant (…) stimuli and can be reinforced following reward feedback (…), similar to stimulus–response associations (…). More recently, however, there has been a realization that learning may not only promote the retrieval of one task set over another but could also modulate the preparedness to switch sets per se. For instance, Dreisbach and Haider (2006) observed that a higher switch likeli- hood (a higher proportion of task switches vs. repetitions in a block of trials) resulted in reduced switch costs. This opened the door to asking whether low-level learning mechanisms can shape cognitive flexibility. “^​2​ ” we recently demonstrated that the act of task switching can be conditioned by reward”^​2​

Switch Cost

” Both task switching and set shifting result in slowing of response times and decreases in accuracy, referred to as a ‘switch cost’. Switch costs are thought to occur because of the time it takes to inhibit the response set of the previous task as well as the time it takes to reconfigure one’s response set to the new task “^​1​ ” Using paradigms in which participants have to switch between two or more tasks, task-switching studies typically focus on the switch cost: slower and less accurate performance on task switches than task repetitions. The switch cost has been interpreted as an index of cognitive-control processes required for reconfiguring the task set (…) or resolving interference from the previously active task set (…). “^​2​

“The switch cost represents the additional cognitive effort required in switching to a different task compared to repeating the same task. Larger switch costs indicate less cognitive flexibility because more effort is required to switch tasks. “^​4​

“Importantly, recent studies have extended these find- ings of context-control learning to the case of cognitive flexibility. For example, it has been shown that switch costs can be reduced for stimuli that are presented at a screen location associated with a higher likelihood of task switches (relative to repetitions), even when people are unaware of this contingency “^​2​

” subliminally presented (i.e., not consciously perceived) cues signaling a higher likelihood of task switches were followed by smaller task-switch costs. “^​2​ ” If the readiness to switch between different tasks can be triggered by contextual cues, such as location, it should also be possible to bind switch readiness to specific task stimuli. “^​2​

Switch Rate. ” As a more tonic and voluntary marker of cognitive flexibility, recent studies have also begun emphasizing the switch rate: how much people choose to switch tasks in a free-choice environment “^​2​

Set Inhibition

“Set inhibition represents performance when returning to prior tasks compared to switching to a different task. Set inhibition may lead to deficits in performance in 2 opposing ways: (1) prior tasks may be inadequately suppressed, or (2) prior tasks may take additional effort to reactivate. When prior tasks are inadequately suppressed, they continue to occupy working memory, thereby increasing cognitive load and decreasing performance on new tasks (e.g., increased errors). Conversely, inefficient reactivation of prior tasks can also be problematic when that task is repeated during the work flow. “^​4​

” Results pertaining to set inhibition indicate that the ability to flexibly return to a previously performed task is not associated with the circadian phase and is instead differentially associated with symptoms of sleepiness and insomnia. “^​4​

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